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ABSTRACT 
The linear and grid based Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are formed by applications where objects 
being monitored are either placed in linear or grid based form. E.g. monitoring oil, water or gas 
pipelines; perimeter surveillance; monitoring traffic level of city streets, goods warehouse monitoring. 
The security of data is a critical issue for all such applications and as the devices used for the monitoring 
purpose have several resource constraints (bandwidth, storage capacity, battery life); it is significant to 
have a lightweight security solution. Therefore, we consider symmetric key based solutions proposed in 
the literature as asymmetric based solutions require more computation, energy and storage of keys. We 
analyse the symmetric ciphers with respect to the performance parameters: RAM, ROM consumption and 
number of CPU cycles. We perform this simulation analysis in Contiki Cooja by considering an example 
scenario on two different motes namely: Sky and Z1. The aim of this analysis is to come up with the best 
suited symmetric key based cipher for the linear and grid based WSN. 
KEYWORDS 
Linear and Grid Based Wireless Sensor Networks, Symmetric Key Based Ciphers, Performance Analysis, 
Contiki Cooja.   
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are considered to be deployed in random or tree based 
fashion. However, there are applications of WSN that form specific topology like linear or grid 
based WSN. The applications where objects being monitored are distributed in either linear or 
square grid inherently form linear and grid based WSN. Examples of the same are: 
i. Monitoring the traffic level of city streets. 
ii. Monitoring pipelines carrying oil, water or gas. 
iii. Monitoring goods in a warehouse. 
iv. Perimeter surveillance. 
The typical examples of nodes forming a linear network and square grid are as shown in Fig. 1 
and 2 respectively. As shown in Fig. 1, there are 7 nodes deployed in a linear fashion and each 
node has a communication range of 2. Therefore, such network is known as (7, 2) linear 
network. 
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Fig. 1. A (7, 2)-linear sensor network. 
 
As shown in Fig. 2, there are 50 houses of a colony deployed in a square grid manner. Here, 
each house is considered to have a device that is used for monitoring the energy consumption of 
the house. These devices pass the aggregated data in a hop by hop manner to the aggregator 
node, which send the data to the BS. Based on the considered application, there can be multiple 
aggregator nodes. The same deployment of devices can be considered for the applications of 
grid based networks. When we consider a single row of houses, it forms a linear network of 10 
houses. Therefore, the grid based WSN are formed through the combination of linear networks 
(when 5 rows are considered, it forms grid based WSN). As the data are passed in hop by hop 
manner for getting the advantage of aggregation as discussed in [1], the security of the same is a 
critical issue. The intermediate nodes can alter or passively monitor the data and use it for their 
own advantage as discussed in [2, 3]. Therefore, the data are required to be encrypted before 
passing to the next node and the same is discussed in [4-6].  
 
 
Fig. 2. Considered scenario of colony forming grid based network. 
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The lightweight schemes for the same are discussed in [7, 8]. However, these schemes do not 
take the deployment knowledge of sensor nodes under consideration unlike the secure data 
aggregation scheme for linear WSN proposed in [9]. For protecting the privacy of data, there are 
schemes proposed in the literature [10-13]. The scheme discussed in [10] is based on the idea of 
pseudonym changing. The idea of anonymous communication is presented in [11]. The key 
establishment scheme for the networks monitoring roads is discussed in [14]. The energy 
efficient communication protocol based on the idea of clustering in road networks is presented 
in [15]. Using the public key cryptography without using the certificates, the authentication 
scheme is discussed in [16]. In this paper, we perform the simulation analysis to find out the 
number of CPU cycles and memory consumption required in providing data security for linear 
and grid WSN. 
The devices (sensor nodes) used in the considered applications are constrained with regard to 
the computation capabilities, battery power, storage, bandwidth [17, 18]. Therefore, we perform 
an analysis on the symmetric key based ciphers (as asymmetric key based ciphers require more 
storage and computation) and analyse the same for the considered example scenario. The 
performance parameters used in the simulation analysis are: RAM, ROM consumption and 
number of CPU cycles. The keys are pre-distributed as proposed in [19]. Such analysis is 
already discussed in the literature [20-22]. However, they have not considered the knowledge of 
deployment of nodes and the specific topology formed by the application. The main objective of 
our work is to come up with the best suited cipher for the considered scenario of linear and grid 
based WSN. Moreover, we perform our analysis on two different motes: sky and z1. The z1 
motes have more capability regarding the RAM and the ash memory and the analysis results 
shows that they require lesser number of CPU cycles as compared to sky motes. In addition, the 
comparison of two operating systems contiki cooja and tinyOS for sensor nodes is discussed in 
the paper. We perform a detailed analysis for one of the most significant cryptographic 
primitives of WSNs: Symmetric Key Block Cipher. We consider the performance parameters, 
storage and energy for a set of candidate lightweight ciphers. Analysing the performance of the 
symmetric key based ciphers with respect to the performance parameters: number of CPU 
cycles and RAM,ROM in contiki cooja, is the major contribution of this paper. 
 
 
1.1 Organization of the Paper 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, brief introduction about the 
examined symmetric key based ciphers is discussed. In Section 3, we look at the simulation 
setup and the methodology for the evaluation of the ciphers. Moreover, the comparison of the 
operating systems contiki cooja and tinyOS is discussed in this section. In Section 4, we show 
the simulation results and discuss the same. We summarize our work with conclusions in 
Section 5. 
 
2. THE SYMMETRIC KEY BASED CIPHERS: EXAMINED 
In this section, we discuss block ciphers that are lightweight in nature. Different ciphers are 
based on different structures like Substitution Permutation Network (SPN), Feistel or Lai-
Massey. AES [23]; KLEIN [24]; LED [25]; PRESENT [26] are based on SPN structure. 
HIGHT [27]; LBlock [28]; MIBS [29]; PICCOLO [30]; SEA [31]; SIMON [32]; TWINE [33] 
are based on Feistel structure. SPECK [32] is based on ARX (Add-Rotate-Xor) structure. IDEA 
[34] is based on Lai-Massey structure. We select these ciphers for the analysis as the 
applications we considered require lightweight solution and with the analysis of the paper we 
come up with the best suited cipher from the considered lightweight ciphers. We provide an 
overview of the examined ciphers and the attacks that are possible on each of them. We do not 
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go in the designing details of the ciphers as our main focus is to analyse the performance in 
terms of CPU cycles and RAM, ROM consumption. 
 
2.1. Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) Structure and Related Ciphers 
SPN structure [35] takes a plaintext block and a key as inputs, and performs exchanging 
"rounds" of substitution (S) and permutation boxes (P-boxes) respectively to deliver the 
ciphertext block. An S-box substitutes a block of bits given as input by another block of bits as 
the output. This substitution must guarantee invertibility. A P-box is a permutation of all the 
bits: it takes input from the outputs of all the S-boxes of previous round, applies permutation of 
bits, and augments them into the S-boxes of the following round. The key is combined using 
some group operation like XOR at each round. The S-boxes and P-boxes transformations are 
efficient to perform in device (like sensors), E.g. exclusive or (XOR) and bitwise rotation. 
 
The following ciphers are based on SPN structure: 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). We analyse two different implementations of Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) ciphers. One is publicly available and other is designed by contiki 
cooja developers. Contiki has LLSec (Link Layer Security) layer. This layer is hardware 
independent, as it uses generic AES driver API instead of directly accessing the hardware. There 
are multiple AES drivers implemented in Contiki - software-only version and a couple of 
hardware accelerated ones, including for CC2420 (the radio chip on Sky mote). Authors of [36] 
show a possible attack on AES, known as biclique cryptanalysis. It uses the concept of 
exhaustive search on the key with an improvement by linking the keys through key schedule. 
This attack takes a time complexity of 2
126.2
 AES encryptions on the data amount 2
88
. The other 
possible attack is meet-in-the-middle [37] that takes less than 2
100
 data/time/memory 
complexity. 
 
KLEIN. We analyse two different implementations of this cipher: KLEIN64 and KLEIN96. 
Both the implementations take 64 bits block size. Key lengths are 80 and 96 bits respectively. 
The number of rounds can either be 12, 16, or 20. The possible attack on this cipher is chosen 
plaintext key recovery as discussed in [38]. 
 
LED. We analyse two different implementations of this cipher: LED64 and LED128. Both the 
implementations take 64 bits block size. Key lengths are 64 and 128 bits respectively. The 
number of rounds is 32 and 48 respectively. This cipher does not use key schedule and this is 
the main difference from other ciphers. The XORing of key is done after every four rounds 
instead of key schedule. The number of rounds of this cipher is more as compared to other 
ciphers for compensating the key schedule. The differential cryptanalysis results on this cipher 
are discussed in [39]. The attacks on LED64 can be reduced to 12 and 16 rounds is described by 
the authors. The other possible attack is meet-in-the-middle as discussed in [40]. The 
complexity of the attack on 8 rounds of LED64 and 16 rounds of LED128 is lesser as compared 
to exhaustive key search. 
 
PRESENT. It is the most popular cipher among all lightweight block ciphers. We analyse two 
different implementations of this cipher: PRESENT Size and PRESENT Speed. Both 
implementations take 64 bits block size. Key lengths are either 80 or 128 bits with number of 
rounds as 31. There many cryptanalysis results as discussed in [41-43]. Authors in [44] discuss 
about two bicliques possible on two implementation of PRESENT. 
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2.2. Feistel Structure and Related Ciphers 
Feistel structure [45] takes plaintext block as input and divides it into two halves, L (left) and R 
(right). R half is given as input to a feistel function along with the round key. It is also used as 
an L half for the next round. Output of the feistel function is XORed with L half and used as an 
R half for the next round. The same process is repeated till last round. The advantage with this 
structure is, just by reversing the key schedule decryption can be done. 
The following ciphers are based on feistel structure (or a modified feistel structure): 
HIGHT. This cipher uses block size of 64 and key length of 128 bits. It uses 32 rounds and 
sometimes uses modular addition instead of XOR operation. The biclique attack against HIGHT 
is proposed in [46]. Moreover, the differential cryptanalysis attack is described in [47]. 
LBLOCK. This cipher uses block size of 64 and key length of 80 bits. The number of rounds is 
32 and the usage of 8 S-boxes and permutation of 4 bits are applied. The biclique attack against 
LBLOCK is proposed in [48]. The authors also discuss the prevention of this attack with the 
help of modified key schedule algorithm. 
MIBS. We analyse two different implementations of this cipher: MIBS64 and MIBS80. Both 
implementations take 64 bits block size. Key lengths are 64 and 80 bits respectively. The linear 
attacks on MIBS are discussed in [49]. The authors show the differential cryptanalysis on 14 
rounds, ciphertext only attacks on 13 rounds and an impossible differential attack on 12 rounds 
of MIBS. 
PICCOLO. We analyse two different implementations of this cipher: PICCOLO80 and 
PICCOLO128. Both implementations take 64 bits block size. Key lengths are 80 and 128 bits 
respectively. It uses two feistel functions. It requires less than 1000 gates when implemented on 
hardware. Authors of [44] discuss the biclique attacks on both the implementations of 
PICCOLO. 
SEA. This cipher uses n bits block size. The value of n can be 48, 96, or 144 bits. It uses a two 
branch feistel structure as modified feistel structure. The security analysis is discussed in [31]. 
SIMON. This cipher uses different block sizes like 32, 48, 64, 96, 128 bits. It is based on a 
balanced feistel network. The key size can be 64, 72, 96, 128, 144, 192, 256 bits. It is optimized 
for the hardware implementations. The differential cryptanalysis is possible on this cipher as 
discussed in [50, 51]. 
TWINE. We analyse two different implementations of this cipher: TWINE80 and TWINE128. 
Both the implementations take 64 bits block size. Key lengths are 80 and 128 bits respectively. 
The number of rounds is 36 in both the implementations. The feistel function uses a single Sbox 
and subkey addition. This function is repeated 8 times in each round. Two biclique attacks on 
two implementations are discussed in [52]. 
2.3. Add-Rotate-Xor Structure and Related Cipher 
This structure involves 3 operations: 
1. Modular Addition 
2. Rotation with fixed rotation amounts 
3. XOR 
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These ARX operations are immune to timing attacks because they run in defined constant time. 
As these operations are fast and cheap in hardware and software, the ciphers based on ARX 
operations are popular. 
 
SPECK. This cipher uses different block sizes like 32, 48, 64, 96, 128 bits. It is based on an 
Add-Rotate-Xor (ARX) structure. The key size can be 64, 72, 96, 128, 144, 192, 256 bits. It is 
optimized for the software implementations. The differential cryptanalysis is possible on this 
cipher as discussed in [50, 51]. 
 
2.4. Lai-Massey Structure and Related Cipher 
As shown in Fig. 3, Lai-Massey Structure [53] divides the plaintext in two equal halves L0 and 
R0 as input. Two round functions are used; H and F. Keys are used with function F. The output 
of function H is given as input to function F. 
  
 
 
Fig. 3. Lai-Massey Structure 
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IDEA. This cipher uses 64 bits block size and 128 bits key. It is composed of 8.5 rounds. A 
final round that is "half round", comes after eight rounds and used for the output transformation 
(the swap of the centre two values counterbalances the swap toward the end of the last round, so 
that there is no net swap). It is included in the package PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). There is six 
rounds attack that exploits key schedule of IDEA with linear cryptanalysis as discussed in [54]. 
The biclique framework is used by the authors of [55] to speed up the key recovery. 
 
The summary of all the examined symmetric key based block ciphers with regard to the 
structure they are built on, block size, key size, and the attacks that are possible on each of them 
is shown in Table 1. From all the examined ciphers, SIMON and SPECK are considered to be 
the block ciphers for IoT (Internet of Things) environment as discussed in [56]. 
 
Table 1.  Summary of Block Ciphers Examined. 
Sr. No. Cipher Refer- 
ence 
Block Size 
 (bits) 
Key Size 
 (bits) 
Structure Possible Attacks 
1 AES [23] 128 128 SPN - Biclique 
cryptanalysis [36] 
- Meet-in-the-
middle [37] 
2 HIGHT [27] 64 128 Fiestel - Differential 
cryptanalysis [47] 
3 IDEA [34] 64 128 Lai-Massey - Linear 
cryptanalysis [54] 
- Biclique [55] 
4 KLEIN [24] 64 64,96 SPN - Chosen plaintext 
[38] 
5 LBLOCK [28] 64 80 Fiestel - Biclique [48] 
6 LED [25] 64 64,128 SPN - Differential 
cryptanalysis [39] 
- Meet-in-the-
middle [40] 
7 MIBS [29] 64 64,80 Fiestel - Differential 
cryptanalysis [49] 
8 PRESENT [26] 64 80 SPN - Cryptanalysis [41-
43] 
- Biclique [44] 
9 PICCOLO [30] 64 80,128 Fiestel - Biclique [44] 
10 SEA [31] 96 96 Fiestel - Cryptanalysis [31] 
11 SIMON [32] 32,48,64, 
96,128 
64,72,96,128, 
144,192,256 
Fiestel - Differential 
Cryptanalysis [50, 
51] 
12 SPECK [32] 32,48,64, 
96,128 
64,72,96,128, 
144,192,256 
ARX - Differential 
Cryptanalysis [50, 
51] 
13 TWINE [33] 64 80,128 Fiestel - Biclique [52] 
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3. SIMULATION SETUP AND THE METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATION 
We analyse the number of CPU cycles and RAM, ROM consumption in achieving data security 
for the secure data aggregation scheme proposed in [9]. The scheme uses the pre distributed 
keys (proposed in [19]) for the purpose of encryption. We work with the nodes that are 
constrained regarding: 
- Storage 
- Communication range (It is assumed that nodes can communicate at least till one hop) 
- Battery life 
Contiki Cooja is a simulator specifically designed for IoT devices that are having the constraints 
as described. It is also used as an emulator because the code to be executed by the node is the 
exact same firmware one may upload to physical nodes [57]. 
 
3.1. Simulation Setup 
 
This section discusses the simulation results for the considered example scenario. We focus on 
the data security as it is crucial when designing a data aggregation scheme. Passively acquired 
data can be used for malicious purpose if confidentiality of data is not taken care of. Our criteria 
are to measure the number of CPU cycles and RAM, ROM consumption for providing data 
security. In contiki cooja, there are several options regarding the selection of devices for which 
one wants to emulate. E.g. Cooja mote, MicaZ mote, CC430 mote, Z1 mote, Sky mote, etc. The 
comparison between the operating systems TinyOS and Contiki is discussed in [58]. In TinyOS, 
the application has to be replaced totally when the code is changed. However, the contiki OS is 
better when it comes to updating the deployed application as it can dynamically replace the 
changed programs. The protocol proposed in [9, 59] require the code to be updated every time 
the value of N (total number of nodes in the network) or k (number of consecutive nodes) is 
changed. Moreover, Contiki supports dynamic loading and unloading of the code and multi-
threading. Contiki is an event driven OS and event handlers cannot pre-empt each other. 
However, interrupts can pre-empt the current running process. 
 
We use Sky motes and Z1 motes of contiki cooja for the purpose of simulation. Sky mote 
features a 16-bit MSP430 MCU, 10 kB RAM, 48 kB ROM, a cc2420 802.15.4 radio 
transceiver, an external Flash memory, and temperature, humidity and brightness sensor [17]. 
Z1 mote has higher configuration and uses MSP430F2617 MCU [18]. The specifications 
considered for Sky and Z1 motes are as shown in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. 
 
Table 2. Sky mote Specifications 
Flash Memory 48 KB 
RAM  10 KB 
Current Consumption 20 mA 
Operating Voltage 3 V 
Micro-controller MSP430 
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Table 3. Z1 mote Specifications 
Flash Memory 92 KB 
RAM  8 KB 
Current Consumption 19.7 mA 
Operating Voltage 3 V 
Micro-controller MSP430F2617 
 
3.1. Methodology for Evaluation of Ciphers 
In this section, we analyse the symmetric key based block ciphers with regard to the number of 
CPU cycles, energy and memory they consume if applied on Sky and Z1 Motes. The energy is 
calculated through following steps: 
 
- Add the header file #include “energest.h" in a .c file of the considered cipher. 
 
- To get CPU cycles involved in the different ciphers, add “printf(“energy cpu: %lu", 
energest_type_time(ENERGEST_TYPE_CPU));" line in PROCESS_THREAD of the .c file. 
 
- To get the power consumption, the formula is: Power(mW) =  
 
Sky and Z1 motes have 20mA current value and 3V voltage. Therefore, CPU cycles received 
from running the code on Sky or Z1 motes, if multiplied with 60 will give the power 
consumption in Watts. When this value is multiplied with simulation time, it gives energy 
consumption in joules. For getting the number of CPU cycles involved in ciphers, we run each 
cipher separately and follow the steps as discussed. Fig. 4 shows the simulation result, when we 
run a TWINE cipher on a grid of 20 Sky motes. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Simulation of Twine80 Cipher with Sky Mote 
VmA
LPMCPU
ONrx
3*20*

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In order to obtain the memory (RAM, ROM) consumption, we use “size" command. Fig. 5 
shows the use of size command. Here, .text column refers to the ROM consumption by different 
ciphers in bytes. The .data and .BSS columns show the RAM consumption. We run all the 
ciphers in the same manner on both Sky and Z1 motes respectively and the results are as shown 
in Tables 4 and 5.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Size command on Twine Cipher with Sky Mote 
 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS 
We can see from the Table 4 that, each cipher requires different amount of CPU cycles and 
RAM, ROM consumption in the grid network of 20 sky motes. The one that requires maximum 
number of CPU cycles is LED128 (11117) and the one that requires minimum number of CPU 
cycles is KLEIN64 (1401). The AES designed by contiki developers specifically for sky motes 
uses hardware acceleration that helps in reducing number of CPU cycles compared to publicly 
defined AES (from Table 4, we can see AES (Contiki) requires 1503 whereas AES (Public) 
requires 1582 number of CPU cycles). SPECK (128 bits block and key size) cipher is designed 
specifically for resource constrained environments requires 1403 number of CPU cycles. 
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Table 4.  Sky Mote: No. of CPU Cycles and RAM, ROM 
Cipher CPU Cycles RAM,ROM (bytes) 
AES (Contiki)  1503 49973 
AES (Public)  1582 51329 
HIGHT   1461 50093 
IDEA  2375 50151 
KLEIN64   1401 50719 
KLEIN96  1562 50763 
LBLOCK  1404 50555 
LED64  7819 50149 
LED128  11117 50133 
MIBS64  1559 50381 
MIBS80  1632 50947 
PRESENT_Size   4224 51187 
PRESENT_Speed  3715 51251 
PICCOLO80   1487 50055 
PICCOLO128   1512 50111 
SEA  1665 49923 
SIMON128  1808 50731 
SPECK128  1403 49995 
TWINE80  1668 49943 
TWINE128  1716 50137 
 
 
Table 5.  Z1 Mote: No. of CPU Cycles and RAM, ROM 
Cipher CPU Cycles RAM,ROM (bytes) 
AES (Contiki)  633 49279 
AES (Public)  285 49131 
HIGHT   167 48409 
IDEA  643 48453 
KLEIN64   184 48995 
KLEIN96  262 49043 
LBLOCK  176 48479 
LED64  2899 48499 
LED128  4342 48483 
MIBS64  242 48421 
MIBS80  277 48631 
PRESENT_Size   1300 49021 
PRESENT_Speed  896 49043 
PICCOLO80   237 48383 
PICCOLO128   251 48451 
SEA  310 48319 
SIMON128  373 49079 
SPECK128  128 48347 
TWINE80  307 48333 
TWINE128  336 48531 
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When we run all the ciphers on the Z1 mote, it takes a lesser number of CPU cycles as we can 
see from Table 5 (AES (pub) on sky mote takes 1582 CPU cycles, whereas on Z1 mote it takes 
285 CPU cycles). The AES code provided by contiki cooja developers is specifically designed 
for Sky mote by using hardware acceleration. Therefore, the RAM consumption of the same is 
lesser as shown in Table 4. The number of CPU cycles for Z1 motes is always lesser compared 
to Sky motes, as the configuration of Z1 mote is superior concerning the flash memory that can 
be used as either RAM or ROM. Therefore, the number of CPU cycles for running different 
ciphers is lesser for Z1 motes compared to Sky motes as shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
 
 
 
The comparison of the CPU cycles required by both the motes is as shown in Fig. 6. It shows 
that Z1 mote takes lesser number of CPU cycles as compared to Sky mote for all the ciphers. 
The comparison in terms of RAM and ROM consumption of both the motes is as shown in  
Fig. 7. It shows that Z1 mote takes lesser amount of RAM, ROM consumption as compared to 
Sky mote in running all the ciphers. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
We analysed symmetric key based block ciphers on two different motes (sky and z1) in contiki 
cooja. This analysis concerning the number of CPU cycles and RAM, ROM consumption helps 
in deciding which cipher can be used for the secure data aggregation scheme in different 
scenarios. In the constrained scenario of sensor nodes, it is better to use lightweight ciphers such 
as HIGHT; KLEIN; PICCOLO; SIMON; SPECK or TWINE. The hardware accelerated AES 
cipher by contiki cooja uses minimum number of CPU cycles when we take Sky mote under 
consideration. Since speed is correlated with energy consumption, SPECK 128/128 is a better 
choice in energy critical applications as it produces energy efficient solution with an encryption 
cost of 1403 cycles on Sky mote, or 128 cycles on Z1 mote. We have given a detailed analysis 
for one of the most significant cryptographic primitives for WSNs: Symmetric Key Block 
Cipher, by considering the performance parameters, storage and energy for a set of candidate 
lightweight ciphers. We are working on optimizing the AES cipher regarding speed (reducing 
the number of CPU cycles) and size (reducing the RAM, ROM consumption). This optimized 
version of AES will be hardware independent. i.e. it will not depend on the mote under 
consideration (E.g. sky or z1) and produce the optimal results. 
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